SEX DIFFERENCES IN BARGAINING BEHAVIOR

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Within the past decade, the number of legal questions regarding discrimination on the basis of sex has heightened the consciousness of the organizational and academic community. Concomitant with this increased interest in the general scope of actions within the area of human resources is the rise of interest in the array of research in bargaining behavior dealing with the variable of sex differences. In this survey of literature, Rubin and Brown [4] have uncovered approximately 100 studies highlighting the relationships between the sex variable and numerous aspects of bargaining behavior.

PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY

Rubin and Brown point out that the multiplicity of studies using sex differences as an independent variable is cue to the relative "economy" of the variable [4, p. 169]. In other words, since most of the research is conducted utilizing a sample of college students, it is relatively easy for the researcher to divide the sample on the basis of sex and make comparisons with the variables of major interest.
The studies are categorized as follows:
1. Studies concluding no systematic relationships between sex and
   a. relative frequency of cooperative behavior in two- person games;
   b. relative frequency of cooperative behavior in coalitions;
   c. frequency of reward in regard to a like sexed- other:
   d. extent of suspiciousness of another's honesty.
2. Studies suggesting that males behave more cooperatively than females.
3. Studies suggesting that females behave more cooperatively than males. (Rubin and Brown, 1975)

It is interesting to note that the vast majority of these studies have been conducted utilizing the Prisoners Dilemma (PD) paradigm. Approximately 70Z of the reported studies centered around the PD paradigm popularly described by Luce and Raiffa [3]. The majority of the other studies employed either the Parcheesi Coalition game [5] or the Acme-Bolt Trucking game [1]. Yet, each of these three paradigms are highly suspect in terms of their ability to allow the expression of individual differences. Neither the PD paradigm nor the Acme-Bolt Trucking game enable the bargainers to engage in the sequential exchange of offers and counter offers essential to the structure of a bargaining relationship. If the bargaining relationship is to transcend the minimal contact of a transactional process, it must necessarily evolve around an exchange process of a transactional nature. The seemingly contradictory results from the

numerous social psychological studies of the relationships between the sex variable and bargaining behavior may be due simply to the failure of the game to allow the individual difference to have an effect.

In order to attempt to reconcile some of the seemingly discrepant findings of studies dealing with sex differences in bargaining behavior, an exploratory study was made utilizing KUBSIM, a collective bargaining simulation [2]. This simulation was designed to enable the participants to experience the dynamics of the contract negotiation subsystem of collective bargaining. The participants in the simulation become familiar with the bargaining strategies, issues, and pressures involved in labor-management negotiations. The simulation meets all of the characteristics found in a bargaining relationship [4, p. 32].

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

Subjects for this study were students enrolled in an upper- division undergraduate course in Personnel Management at a major Midwestern University. The students were assigned to teams on the basis of sex as follows:

TABLE 1
TEAM ASSIGNMENT BY SEX

TEAM	NUMBER OF MALES	NUMBER OF FEMALES	CATEGORY
Management 1	5	0	M
Management 2	2	3	Fm
Management 3	3	2	Mf
Management 4	5	0	M
Management 5	4	0	M
Management 6	4	0	M
Union 1	0	5	F
Union 2	3	2	Mf
Union 3	2	3	Fm
Union 4	0	5	F
Union 5	3	1	Mf
Union 6	4	0	M
	35	21	

Code:
M - All male
F - All female
Mf - Predominantly male
Fm - Predominantly female

Within the teams, each student selected a role to represent within the simulation. The roles within management teams were:

1.	Director-Corporate Industrial Relations
2.	Director-Financial Operations
3.	Director-Operations Management

    4.   Treasurer-Local Union

    5.   Chief Plant Steward-Local Union

The student teams prepared for the negotiation on an independent basis and were paired, management team against union team. The negotiations were for a period of 3 hours. If an agreement on the contract was not reached within the allocated time frame, a strike would occur. The pairings for the negotiation were as follows:

TABLE 2
Negotiation Pairings

Management Teams		Union Teams	
Number	Composition	Number	Composition
1	M	1	F
2	Fm	2	Mf
3	Mf	3	Fm
4	F	4	M
5	M	5	Mf
6	M	6	M

The negotiation pairings were counterbalanced by sex and team designation such that Male, (M), management negotiated against Female, (F), union and vice versa. Predominantly male (Mf) union negotiated against predominantly Female (Fm) management and counterbalanced.

RESULTS OF THE STUDY

Prior to the negotiations, each teem was required to prepare a list of items demanded; the priorities of the items demanded; instead demand expectation; lowest acceptable offer; and, expectation. An analysis of these items are as follows. The priorities of the demands as ranked by the union teams is included in Table 3.

TABLE 3
Priorities Ranked by Union Teams

Demand	Team---1(F)	2(Mf)	3(Fm)	4(F)	5 (Mf)	6(M)
Wages	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fringe Benefits	2	2	2	2	2	2
Job Security		3	3	3		4
Subcontracting	5	5	4	4	4	5
Administrative	4	7	6	5,8		3
Grievance clause	3	4	8	7		
Mgmt. rights	6	6	10	7		
Overtime			5	6	3	
Contract langauge			7			
Total demands	6	7	10	8	4	5

Although F-dominated teams demanded more contract changes (x = 8) than N-dominated teams (x = 5), the priority rankings are substantially similar. All teams ranked wages and fringe benefits as the instead two demand priorities. No significant differences in ranking patterns were evident in terms of the remaining demands.

TABLE 4
Priorities Ranked by Management Teams

Demand	Team: 1(M)	2(Fm)	3(Mf)	Rankings 4(M)	5(M)	6(M)
Absenteeism	1	1	3	2	4	2
Arbitration Case	3	3	2	1	3	3
Contract length	4		6	6	1	1
Grievance clause	2	8		3	6	5
Management rights		6	1		2	
No strike clause			5		9	4
Overtime Policy		2	4			
Pension Plan					5	
Wages				7		9
Stewards					8	
Seniority	7					6
Sabotage		5				7
Scope of Contract						8
Sick Time Policy		7				
Payment Timing				5		
Check off Clause	5					
Job Rising		4				
Lunch period					10	
Job Evaluation	6				7	
Total Demands	7	8	6	7	10	9

The priorities of demands as ranked by the management team were as follows:
There was no significant difference in terms of the number of demands by F-dominated (x = 7) and M-dominated teams (x 7.6). No substantial patterns of differentiation occurred. Part of this may be due to the small number of F-dominated teams with management designation (n = 1). Since this structural defect was inherent throughout the simulation, further analysis concentrated on the union teams.

Since wages were the top priority of all union teams, the following table enumerates the initial wage demand and expected wage settlements:

TABLE 5
Comparison of Initial Wage Demand and Expectations

Teams	Initial Demand		Expected Settlement	
	Skilled	Unskilled	Skilled	Unskilled
1(F)	.40	.40	.40	.40
2(Mf)	1.49	1.26	1.25	1.06
3(Fm)	1.25	1.15	.75	.75
4(F)	.89	.61	.89	.61
5(Mf)	1.19	1.01	.95	.81
6(M)	1.79	1.52	1.31	1.01

In terms of instead demand, the F-dominated teams asked for a significantly lower hourly wage increase (x skilled = .85; ~ unskilled = .72) than the M-dominated teams (~ skilled = $1.49; unskilled = $1.26). All wage demands were changed into monetary rather than percentage increases and since all teams demanded a COLA clause, this was deleted for purpose of comparison. In terms of expectations, the M-dominated teams expected a significantly higher settlement (~ skilled = 1.17; unskilled = .96) than the F-dominated teams (~ skilled = .68; unskilled = .59). It is to be noted that F-dominated teams land 4 expected the same settlement as their initial demand.

A comparison of the yielding behavior and actual settlement of the teams are as follows:

TABLE 6

Team	Settlement		Yielding Balances	
	Skilled	Unskilled	Skilled	Unskilled
1(F)	.40	.40	-0-	-0-
2(Mf)	1.49	1.26	-0-	-0-
3(Fm)	.65	.65	.60	.60
4(F)	NOT SETTLED		---	---
5(Mf)	1.19	1.01	-0-	-0-
6(M)	.90	.76	.89	.76

It is to be noted that in three cases, no yielding behavior was evidenced on the wage issue. Team #4 (F) which negotiated against a M-team did not reach agreement.

CONCLUSIONS

Overall conclusions would have to differentiate cooperativeness as defined by a lower instead demand from cooperativeness as defined by yielding behavior and the actual settlement. In terms of a lower instead demand, the F-dominated teams requested a significantly lower hourly rate than the M--dominated teams. However, in terms of yielding behavior and categories of teams demanded, no significant difference occurred. Perhaps, the ambiguous results of this study underscore the rationale as to the number of studies conducted utilizing the PD paradigm. As the level of data richhess and external validity of the paradigm increases, there is a

concomitant increase in measurement problems. It often becomes exceedingly difficult to operationalize the dependent variable of interest. Yet these problems are inherent in studies in the area of experiential learnings. Perhaps greater progress will be made as increased attention is placed on measurement.

REFERENCES

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