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ABSTRACT

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An empirical investigation was undertaken in an experientially oriented collective bargaining situation. A contract negotiation paradigm was developed for 79 students in an undergraduate wage and salary administration course. This paradigm utilized the concept of "vested interest" and demonstrates that this concept can be effectively incorporated into a collective bargaining game construct and, subsequently, enhance the utility of the pedagogy with respect to the maximization of experiential value. The methodology employed is presented as being composed of the psychological preparation, selection of negotiating teams, exogenous and endogenous environments, role assignments of the participants and the role of the instructor. The resultant game closely simulates the psychological environment of labor-management negotiations and, consequently, is felt to significantly increase the value of the game as a teaching technique.

The experimental phase of the investigation deals primarily with the selection of negotiating teams and the resultant change in participant attitudes and satisfaction. Participants were polled as to which side of the Bargaining table they would prefer, labor or management. On a random basis, half of the students were given their choice of negotiating teams and the remainder of the students were assigned to the opposing teams. This resulted in 4 Management teams composed of students who had requested the management side. These teams are referred to as Congruent Management teams. Due to the team assignments, 4 labor teams were composed of students who had requested the management side. These teams are referred to as Incongruent Labor teams. Similarly, 4 Labor teams were composed of students who had requested the labor side. These teams are referred to as the Congruent Labor teams. Again, due to the team assignment process 4 Management teams were composed of students who had requested the labor team. These teams are referred to as Incongruent Management.

The actual negotiation alignment was developed in an effort to investigate the affect of four different types of team arrangements upon the quality of the final settlement. These four types are:

- Type one-Congruent Management versus Congruent Labor
- Type two-Congruent Management versus Incongruent Labor
- Type three-Incongruent Management versus Congruent Labor
- Type four-Incongruent Management versus Incongruent Labor

The dependent measures included the differential attitude change of participants, satisfaction of the participants with the negotiation experience, and overall quality of the final settlement. Attitude change and satisfaction was measured

with a pre/post test design. The pre-test questionnaire was factor analyzed and yielded three main factors. Factor one was an-overall satisfaction measure, factor two was a measure of attitudes held toward management, and factor three was a measure of attitudes held toward Labor. Although these factors were only developed from the results of the pre-test questionnaire, the results of the post-test questionnaire will also be factor analyzed to ensure ability of the factors. The overall quality of the final settlements will be judged by a blind panel of outside experts.

Several hypotheses have been developed and are presented below along with a brief explanation of their underlying rationale.

Hypothesis One--Attitude change among the Incongruent teams will be greater than among the Congruent teams. It is hypothesized that incongruent teams would have greater attitude change due to their role reversals.

Hypothesis Two--Congruent teams will have greater satisfaction than incongruent teams as measured by factor One of the post-test questionnaire. It is hypothesized that congruent teams will have greater satisfaction with their team assignment because their expressed values are more in line with their role as negotiators.

Hypothesis Three--Type four negotiation will yield the highest overall quality settlements. This is hypothesized to be the result of less closely held values on the part of the incongruent teams, thereby allowing these teams to be more reasonable and flexible.

Hypothesis Four--Congruent teams will have more advantageous settlements when bargaining against incongruent teams. This is hypothesized to be the result of the congruent teams having more closely held values and, thus, being more rigid than the incongruent teams. Since each team has a "vested interest" in the outcome of the negotiation, it is felt that the most rigid team in any particular set of negotiators will gain the advantage in that negotiation set.

Hypothesis Five--Type one negotiations will yield the lowest overall quality settlements. This is hypothesized to be the result of two relatively rigid teams with closely held values being in direct conflict. This type of arrangement is felt to generate the most conflict and the least advantageous settlements.

Hypothesis Six--Negotiation team leaders will have higher levels of satisfaction than non-leaders. This is hypothesized as a test of Herzberg's two factor theory. Since leaders tend to have more enriched jobs; they tend to be more satisfied.

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The final data will not be available until after the end of the fall semester. It is proposed that the completed paper will be ready by the middle of February, 1976. This date could be moved up if absolutely necessary.